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True Confessions of The New York Times: 
Making Moral Meaning from the Discourse  
of Flawed Iraq Coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
The Mea Culpa 
 
On the morning of May 26, 2004, New York Times readers found a note from the 
paper’s editors on Page A10.  Other newspaper readers across the country found the same 
note in their own dailies; it was one of the wire stories available that day to the 300 
papers that subscribe to the Times News Service.  The headline read “From the Editors – 
The Times and Iraq,” and the 1,000-word article that followed served as an explanation to 
readers that the Times had failed in its duty of both aggressive information gathering and 
reporting with a critical eye, specifically in regard to its coverage of the lead-up to the 
Iraq war.  While the editors maintained that much of the Times’ reporting was solid, their 
note to readers focused on:  
a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should 
have been.  In some cases, information that was controversial then, and 
seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand 
unchallenged.  Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-
examining the claims as new evidence emerged – or failed to emerge 
(“From the Editors,” 2004, p. A10). 
 
Unlike the now infamous Jayson Blair case at The New York Times, the problems 
here couldn’t be pinned on one misguided journalist.  The failure in coverage, editors 
implied, was an institutional one; the problematic articles were written and edited by a 
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number of staff members.  However, the articles did share a common feature.  “They 
depended at least in part on information from a circle of Iraqi informants, defectors and 
exiles bent on ‘regime change’ in Iraq, people whose credibility has come under 
increasing public debate in recent weeks” (p. A10). 
The articles made claims that Iraq housed terrorist training camps, hidden 
weapons facilities, and biological weapons labs and that Saddam Hussein’s regime had 
ties to Al Qaeda.  “Articles based on dire claims about Iraq tended to get prominent 
display [often on Page 1], while follow-up articles that called the original ones into 
question were sometimes buried.  In some cases, there was no follow-up at all” (p. A10). 
 In the note, editors listed several specific examples of coverage spanning from 
October 2001 through April 2003 and pointed out particular problem areas, often 
stemming from sources whose claims were taken, in many respects, at face value.  After 
pointing readers to an on-line site that included a sample of the coverage in question, the 
editors ended their note this way: 
We consider the story of Iraq’s weapons, and the pattern of 
misinformation, to be unfinished business.  And we fully intend to 
continue aggressive reporting aimed at setting the record straight (p. A10). 
 
 
The Aftermath.  Response to the editors’ note was fast and widespread.  Not 
only did Daniel Okrent, the Times’ public editor, use his column four days later to present 
an in-depth analysis of the failure, news people at papers across the country commented 
on the note in their papers.  Discussions also ran in journalism trade publications such as 
Editor & Publisher, on radio programs such as NPR’s “Weekend Edition” and on sites 
for media criticism such as PressThink, the project of Columbia University scholar Jay 
Rosen.  Between May 26 – the day the editors’ note ran – and June 3, no fewer than 20 
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responses appeared in the form of columns, stories and analyses in U.S. media outlets.  
While some of these focused particularly on the Times’ flawed coverage and how that 
coverage may have affected public opinion about the war, others responded to the Times’ 
decision to “talk” to its readers, to “come clean” about its failures.   
The discourse surrounding the Times’ disclosure – the editors’ note together with 
the responses it generated – provides a glimpse into the state of American journalism and 
the way those enmeshed in it understand and expect the practice to operate.  Beyond 
serving a descriptive purpose, however, the texts of the report and responses can be used 
to start a new discourse in the normative realm, to offer suggestions for how our 
understanding of journalism perhaps ought to change to better reflect the reality of what 
is, after all, a human institution.   
The following discussion provides both a descriptive and normative analysis of 
two themes that emerge within the discourse of The New York Times editors’ note and the 
responses to it.  First, the failure at the Times seems to add another notch to the credibility 
crisis in which U.S. journalism currently finds itself.  The disclosure and the responses 
bring to light concerns about the press and its performance and make more tangible 
recent accusations from the public that it is losing its trust in the press.i   
If the first trend illuminates problems, the second shows progress by 
demonstrating that the press, or at least one of its most powerful organizations, 
recognizes that it is a fallible, human institution and one that should – is even morally 
required to – communicate with its audiences about the process of news telling.  It is 
through precedent-setting cases like this one that the practice of journalism can step back, 
take a look at itself, and then continue moving forward in a landscape constantly in flux.   
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Illuminating the Problems: 
Journalism’s Deepening Credibility Crisis 
 
Early in 2004, the Project for Excellence in Journalism, in affiliation with the 
Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, released the first of what is to be an 
annual report on the state of the American news media.  In its investigation of the public 
and the press, the study found that public attitudes about journalism have been declining 
for nearly 20 years.  “Americans think journalists are sloppier, less professional, less 
moral, less caring, more biased, less honest about their mistakes and generally more 
harmful to democracy than they did in the 1980s” (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 
2004, “Public Attitudes,” ¶2).  On top of that, Americans are wary of journalists’ 
motives, believing that ambition, self-interest and a drive to make money take precedence 
over working in the public interest.  All of these critiques describe a social institution in 
the midst of a credibility crisis – a crisis only exacerbated by problems like those at The 
New York Times.  The following section introduces three particular facets of the 
credibility crisis that were illuminated when the Times disclosed the failures of its Iraq 
coverage. 
A Crisis of Conventions.  The most comprehensive analysis of and commentary 
on the Times’ disclosure came from within the paper itself four days after the editors’ 
note ran.  A handful of media watchers speculated that public editor Daniel Okrent had 
been investigating the issue for some time before the paper’s editors took action and that 
the editors’ note was an attempt to preempt anything that might come from Okrent.  
Others were quick to say that the Times was late in speaking out on the issue; after all, 
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Jack Shafer of the online magazine Slate had called on The New York Times every three 
of four days for more than a year to take a look at its Iraq coverage.  Still others remarked 
that the timing of the note was overly coincidental; it came out only days after the U.S. 
administration had repudiated Ahmed Chalabi – an Iraqi defector, key informant to the 
United States, and one of the Times’ primary sources.  All of these questions of timing 
led Tim Rutten of the Los Angeles Times to say that “the [New York] Times’ explanation 
looks like a leaky lifeboat launched in the teeth of a gathering storm” (Rutten, 2004, p. 
E1).  Jay Rosen on his weblog PressThink was slightly more compassionate in his 
assessment of the note’s timing, remarking that “sustained criticism from without, 
interacting with events, triggered an internal audit, and an official act of self-criticism 
was published in the Times” (2004, ¶ 8).  Whatever the case and regardless of the timing, 
Okrent reported in his column that the Times editors examined the paper’s coverage 
independently of his own.  And in his final assessment, Okrent reported that “they [the 
editors] got it right.  Mostly” (2004, Sec. 4, p. 2).  
Okrent called his column a bit like a Journalism 101 course and in it criticized 
several journalistic “imperatives and practices” – exacerbated by the culture of the Times 
newsroom – that conspired to lead the paper down an unfortunate path.  When taken as a 
whole, these imperatives and practices tell one tale: Journalism is a competition, a race to 
get the big story…and then to get the next big story.  And news organizations, as well as 
individual reporters, are playing to win.  In disclosing the paper’s flawed coverage, 
Okrent argued that The New York Times editors explained how the paper failed, but they 
neglected to explain why it failed – what journalistic imperatives and practices drove the 
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actions that led to the substandard reporting.  For Okrent, these actions were driven by 
journalists’ charge to: 
• Be first.  Journalism has a hunger for scoops, and in some of the Times’ coverage, 
the drive to be first took precedence over that of being right. 
• Write for the front page.  According to Okrent, “There are few things more 
greedily desired than a byline on Page 1,” and those bylines are best achieved by 
making aggressive assertions that make big impacts (2004, Sec. 4, p.2). 
• Get the big story; never mind the follow-up.  Okrent called this hit-and-run 
journalism.  Rather than revisiting a big story and re-examining the assertions 
made in it, Times reporters put their efforts toward the next big story.  Failing to 
follow-up, Okrent argued, may be conventional behavior, but it is a grave 
mistake.  “Stories, like plants, die if they are not tended.  So do the reputations of 
newspapers” (2004, Sec. 4, p. 2). 
• Coddle your sources to get what you want.  Many sources in the Times’ coverage 
went unnamed, only described as Iraqi defectors, exiles, informants, or American 
intelligence sources.  But, as Okrent argued, information does not earn immunity; 
a source’s misdeeds must be revealed, and reporters must be willing to help do 
that.  A source who turns out to have lied has breached the contract that offers 
immunity in exchange for information, and that breach justifies exposure by the 
reporter.  According to Okrent, “When the cultivation of a source leads to what 
amounts to a free pass for the source, truth takes the fall” (2004, Sec. 4, p. 2). 
• Cast aside standard practices in non-standard times.  Okrent called this behavior 
end-run editing, a result of some reporters working outside the lines of customary 
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bureau management; meanwhile, others with reservations about a story are denied 
the opportunity to express those reservations.  “It is axiomatic in newsrooms that 
any given reporter’s story, tacked up on a dartboard, can be pierced by challenges 
from any number of colleagues,” Okrent said.  “When a particular story is 
consciously shielded from such challenges, it suggests that it contains something 
that plausibly should be challenged” (2004, Sec. 4, p. 2).  End-run editing can also 
result from reporters pushing hard and editors failing to push back, failing to 
require their writers to slow down and back up assertions or take out information 
that goes too far.  As Slate’s Jack Shafer said, responsibility for a newspaper’s 
content – as well as the placement of that content – ultimately rests on the 
shoulders of editors (Shafer cited in Kurtz, 2004).  But in the race to get out a big 
story, editorial scrutiny can be substituted for blind faith in the reporter’s work; 
reporters, then, can be aided and abetted by editors. 
 
Two days before Okrent’s column ran, Paul Krugman, also of The New York 
Times, raised another journalistic imperative that proved problematic for the Times and 
its Iraq coverage; he called it the tyranny of evenhandedness and described it as the 
equivalent of being non-biased.  In this instance, the tyranny of evenhandedness played 
out when journalists – ever the bearer of the ultra-liberal label – “bent over backward to 
say nice things about conservatives” in a desperate effort to avoid being pinned as 
“irrational Bush haters” (Krugman, 2004, p. A21).  The irony in this case, as Don Wycliff 
of the Chicago Tribune said, is that “the bell cow of the ‘liberal media’ herd turn[ed] out 
to have been the chief public promoter of the ideas that justified President Bush’s push 
for war” (2004, ¶ 6).  Some critics have contended that Howell Raines, executive editor 
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of the Times during the lead-up to the war, may have thought the reporting could help 
counter the paper’s reputation for liberal bias, but, in the end, the attempt at 
evenhandedness had unforeseen consequences. 
Okrent would surely agree that the imperatives and practices outlined above are 
not unique to The New York Times but are rather journalistic conventions that most news 
organizations find themselves operating within much of the time.  What makes this case 
notable is that problems arising from imperatives and practices at The New York Times 
cause reverberations that are felt far and wide – reverberations that only contribute to 
journalism’s growing credibility crisis.   
A Crisis of Authority.  The second problem illuminated by the editors’ note and 
subsequent responses relates to the Times’ authority, particularly the threat to that 
authority caused by the paper’s failures.  What happens when the country’s most 
respected newspaper – the paper of record – stumbles?  And what does this do to the 
credibility of the institution of the press itself? 
It is widely recognized that the U.S. press as a social institution is tremendously 
powerful; it has the ability to set the agenda, to influence public opinion, and to more 
generally construct the reality that Americans “see.”  The New York Times holds the most 
lofty of positions, and the Times’ influence became the topic of commentary by several 
columnists who responded to the editors’ note.  In his column for The Hartford Courant, 
journalism professor Paul Janensch said:  
The Times is not just another newspaper.  It is devoured every morning by 
opinion leaders in New York, Washington and around the country. 
Virtually every important news operation in the country – in the world, for 
that matter – is influenced by what the Times puts on Page 1 (2004, ¶ 4). 
 
Janensch’s comments were echoed by Don Wycliff, who said of the editors’ note: 
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[it] called attention to the Times’ status as an agenda-setter, both for 
national policymakers and in American journalism.  The fact that The New 
York Times was writing so regularly and seemingly with such authority 
about Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and his terrorist ties carried 
enormous weight in Washington (2004, ¶ 4). 
 
In his column, Wycliff included a comment by Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin, who said that 
the Times’ coverage “blunted a lot of criticism and cowed a lot of critics” (2004, ¶ 4).  
This blunting effect, according to Wycliff, resulted in other news organizations finding it 
difficult to challenge what had become the “reigning consensus about the threat posed by 
the Hussein regime” (2004, 5).  Jay Rosen made a similar point.  The relationship 
between the Times and its peers gets to the heart of the newspaper’s power and 
reputation. “The Times and its front page have always had a powerful influence on the 
judgment of regional editors and other gatekeepers” (Rosen, 2004, ¶ 24). 
Large and small newspapers alike depend on the extensive resources of the Times 
to provide them with stories of national and international import.  The assumption is that 
the Times is doing it right, and the millions of readers who see the world through the lens 
of the Times put faith in the paper of record that the record is, in fact, accurate.  So when 
The New York Times falters, as Gina Lubrano of The San Diego Union-Tribune said, 
“there may be consequences for publications thousands of miles from the Big Apple” 
(2004, p. B9).  For the San Diego paper, which subscribes to the Times News Service, the 
consequences took the form of seven problematic New York Times stories running in the 
Union-Tribune and a call for Union-Tribune editors to “add yet another layer of 
skepticism and listen to their own instincts when stories do not feel quite right” (Lubrano, 
2004, p. B9). 
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At other papers that receive New York Times stories over the wire, the reaction 
was similar.  According to Janensch, “The Times’ mea culpa caught editors at those 
newspapers by surprise, and they were wondering what to tell their readers about the 
now-discredited Times stories they had published” (2004, ¶ 5).  Paul Moore of The 
Baltimore Sun quoted his paper’s editor, who said that “groups of readers will feel even 
more emboldened now to demand we review our work” (Franklin cited in Moore, 2004, 
p. 5C).  And Gene Harbrecht of The Orange County Register, said that his paper will 
pledge to “intensify the screening of all news service stories, particularly the Times” 
because the failure by the Times damaged not only its credibility but, by extension, the 
credibility of the Register as well (2004, ¶ 14).  In this screening process, staffers at the 
Register will consider the sourcing on New York Times stories, question the conclusions 
drawn, compare findings from the Times with other services to gauge their validity, and 
pay attention to the “track record for accuracy of the individual reporters as we have 
come to know their work” (Harbrecht, 2004, ¶ 15). 
Interesting to note in these comments is a kind of “us” versus “them” mentality, 
an assumption that The New York Times alone is to blame – that the commentators’ own 
papers are somehow exempt from failings like this.  These responses to the editors’ note 
also demonstrate a lack of recognition that journalism is not only a group of autonomous 
organizations but a collective, a social institution with shared struggles as well as shared 
triumphs.  In these columns, journalists set themselves and their colleagues apart from 
The New York Times and implied that the credibility threat lies only with the Times and 
not with the press as a whole.   
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There were, however, a few exceptions to this trend.  On CNN’s “Reliable 
Sources,” Washington Post ombudsman Michael Getler made the point that the problems 
at the Times are not necessarily unique to it: 
I think there’s nothing more important than going back and looking at the pre-
war coverage.  There’s been nothing quite like this is the last several decades.  
And every news organization needs to go back and see how they did (Getler cited 
in Kurtz, 2004, ¶ 143). 
 
While readers may recognize that the mistakes of one organization are not 
necessarily those of another, they also tend to view the press in a holistic way – as a 
social institution.  And the credibility of that institution rises and falls not on the efforts 
of a single organization but on the collective actions and the use of power by the 
profession as a whole.  Reactions to the editors’ note that failed to recognize the 
collective threat to journalistic credibility represent only another problem in how the 
press views itself – as disparate, often competitive entities rather than as a public trust 
with the shared goal of enhancing knowledge in a landscape that can be extremely 
complex. 
A(nother) Crisis of Objectivity.  In an October 2003 ZNet commentary, Robert 
Jensen, University of Texas professor and former newsperson, recounted his memories of 
the night he and his colleagues in the newsroom created what he called a hierarchy of 
facts. 
We created five or six categories.  I can’t recall the whole list and long ago 
lost the chart we made that night, but I remember the top and bottom 
categories.  Resting on the top, in the most exalted position, was the 
category of facts to which journalists are most wedded, the facts editors 
like best: Documented Facts.  On the bottom were the facts that potentially 
cause the most trouble for journalists: True Facts (Jensen, 2003, ¶ 3). 
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 The point, Jensen said, was that “the way in which contemporary mainstream 
journalists gather facts about the world privileges those things that can be documented, 
especially from ‘credible’ and ‘authoritative’ sources” (2003, ¶ 5).  With documented 
facts, journalists get two-fold benefits.  First, they get information they can attribute to 
someone or something, which is a safe way of mitigating all kinds of liability.  Second, 
this method of passing along documented facts from credible and authoritative sources 
saves journalists the work of actually verifying the facts with evidence that goes beyond 
documentation or of uncovering the truth themselves.  The problem with documented 
facts, however, is that they are not necessarily the equivalent of true facts.   
The discrepancy between documented facts and true facts is nothing new; a 
moment’s reflection back to the 1950s brings up memories of a load of trouble that a 
certain Joe McCarthy caused for journalists of the time.  This first “crisis of objectivity” 
came during McCarthy’s hunt for communists in America.  McCarthy – a U.S. senator 
and the epitome of a credible and authoritative source – understood journalists and their 
processes of gathering and reporting the news.  McCarthy knew that dutiful journalists 
would report whatever utterances he made.  Consequently, more than one hundred 
American citizens were accused of being communists and tried for their “crimes” in 
congressional hearings as well as in the court of public opinion – the press.  But the 
journalists had been duped, and their method of accurately conveying McCarthy’s 
utterances – his documented facts – turned out to be woefully inaccurate and even untrue 
(Marzolf, 1991). 
Reporters at The New York Times may have also kept their own biases out of their 
work and objectively collected information to pass along to readers, but as history has 
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demonstrated repeatedly, documented facts don’t always lead to the truth.  The editors of 
The New York Times recognized this, noting that the problematic articles: 
depended at least in part on information from a circle of Iraqi informants, 
defectors and exiles bent on “regime change” in Iraq, people whose 
creditability has come under increasing public debate in recent 
weeks…Complicating matters for journalists, the accounts of these exiles 
were often eagerly confirmed by United States officials convinced of the 
need to intervene in Iraq.  Administration officials now acknowledge that 
they sometimes fell for misinformation from these exile sources.  So did 
many news organizations – in particular, this one (“From the Editors,” 
2004, Sec. 4, p. 2). 
 
So, what readers see with The New York Times today quite closely mimics the 
McCarthy-era crisis of objectivity.  According to journalism professor and Miami Herald 
columnist Edward Wasserman, the Times admitted not that it erred, but that “in its haste 
to dominate coverage, it was systematically manipulated by sources to whom its reporters 
became captive” (2004, ¶ 14).  Through the paper’s reliance on these highly placed and 
seemingly credible sources, entirely accurate stories can end up being, as Dan Kennedy 
of the Boston Phoenix called them, entirely false.  “Miller [author of several articles in 
question], her fellow reporters, and their editors had forgotten the Ben Bradlee rule.  
They had thought they were printing the truth when, in fact, they were only printing what 
people had told them” (Kennedy, 2004, ¶ 3). 
In a Los Angeles Times column, Tim Rutten called the controversy surrounding 
the Times’ Iraq coverage, “the most serious of the credibility crises that have afflicted 
America’s mainstream news media over the past two years” (2004, E1).  The Times, he 
said, not only failed to weigh the credibility of the information it was reporting, it 
succeeded, through its lack of skepticism on this issue, in amplifying the administration’s 
position.  As a result of the paper’s reliance on another journalistic convention – 
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documented facts – public opinion and the substance of the national dialogue in the days 
leading up to the war may have been significantly impacted. 
Rutten’s comments were echoed by several others. Paul Janensch, for instance, 
said the foul-up was worse than the Jayson Blair scandal at the Times and the Jack Kelley 
scandal at USA Today.  “News stories by serial fibbers Blair and Kelley were fabricated 
and plagiarized, but they did not support the justification for a war that has cost more 
than 800 American lives and thousands more Iraqi lives” (Janensch, 2004, ¶ 2).  In this 
case, reporters and editors at The New York Times may have looked toward the 
objectivity ideal, but that ideal failed them when their search for truth could not be 
verified beyond the mouths of those who offered the information. 
From Problems to Progress.  The discussion of The New York Times’ 
contribution to the press’ credibility crisis reveals that the problems relate primarily to the 
coverage itself, to the acts of journalism.  A leaning on questionable conventions, a shaky 
use of authority and a mistaken reliance on documented facts from official sources 
combined to shine the light on The New York Times – and U.S. journalism itself – as an 
institution in a state of disrepair.  For a public whose distrust of the media is already at a 
dangerously high level – one that thinks of journalism as “a bottom-line-driven enterprise 
populated by the ethically challenged” (Jurkowitz, 2002, C1) – The New York Times’ 
failures would seem to only exacerbate the crisis.  But looking at the case only 
descriptively, only from the perspective of the problems it illuminated provides just one 
side of a more complex story.  While the Times surely failed, it also made progress.  This 
progress isn’t seen in the particular act of reporting a story but rather in the continually 
evolving way that journalism views itself and how that view affects the relationship that 
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The New York Times – and by extension, that journalism as a whole – has with its public.  
The progress in this relationship, illustrated by three themes, takes the discussion into the 
normative realm and becomes the focus of the next section.     
 
 
Illustrating the Progress: 
Journalism’s Movement Toward Reflection and Discourse 
 
 Increased Transparency.  The editors’ note disclosing flaws in the Times’ Iraq 
coverage was not the first of its kind, but it was certainly one of the first.  Four years 
earlier in 2000, the Times had run a similar assessment of its coverage of Wen Ho Lee, 
disclosing to readers that the paper had been instrumental in falsely accusing the 
suspected spy.  This admission was the first of its kind and considered by many a 
remarkable act for an organization historically reticent to admit any kind of fallibility.  
This 2000 editors’ statement was followed in 2003 by a lengthy explanation – on the 
paper’s front page no less – of the problems created by Jayson Blair and his collection of 
fabricated and plagiarized reports for the paper.   
 This movement toward communicating with readers about the news process is a 
movement toward transparency and, normatively speaking, a step forward.  As in the 
cases of Lee, Blair and the Iraq coverage, transparency in journalism can include 
explanations of news gathering and reporting gone wrong, but it more generally refers to 
the act of the press talking to its audiences about its decisions as well as the rationales 
and justifications that go into making those decisions.  Transparency, as Rosen says, is 
“making it easy for ordinary readers to see for themselves and come to judgment” about 
what their papers do” (2004, ¶ 18). 
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 As noted earlier, some media watchers argued that the Times editors only acted 
because others were criticizing the paper’s Iraq coverage – just as the Wen Ho Lee 
coverage was criticized four years earlier.  This step toward transparency, they said, was 
reactive rather than proactive.  And according to Rosen, who wrote specifically about the 
transparency issue, there may have been a bit of face-saving going on in the editors’ note.  
However, the reality in which The New York Times now operates is different than it was 
in 2000, and many changes at the paper tend toward encouraging transparency all on its 
own.  From the introduction of an ombudsman, a standards editor and weblogs – all of 
which examine and debate what the newspaper does – to the necessity for the Times to 
rebuild its authority with both the public and the rest of the press after the Jayson Blair 
scandal, a new reality is pushing along a new era of transparency in a climate of greater 
scrutiny (Rosen, 2004). 
While a good number of critics spent their time passing judgment on the Times’ 
flawed coverage, some reacted to the note itself, to the attempt by the Times 
communicate with its readers.  Paul Moore, for example, claimed that the editors’ note 
should have been an article and should have appeared on the front page, but he also 
commended the Times, saying that “the newspaper’s decision to publish the editors’ note, 
even in its inconspicuous location, means it is accepting responsibility and trying to be 
accountable to its readers” (2004, 5C).  Don Wycliff gave laurels to the Times for what he 
called an extraordinary editors’ note.  “The Times has not always been a leader in the 
movement to transparency in the news business,” he said.  “But with this editors’ note on 
its Iraq coverage, the Times has established a wise precedent for all of us” (Wycliff, 2004, 
¶ 12). 
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 Wycliff makes a good point.  Through its constantly shifting yet still tangible 
power, the Times sets the news agenda as well as the news telling agenda.  The processes 
and practices in which the Times engages are adopted by other news organizations; the 
Times does still set the precedent.  In 2000, following the Times’ assessment of its Wen 
Ho Lee coverage, Rosen wrote a reaction piece for MediaChannel.org.  He posted the 
piece again after the editors’ note regarding the Iraq coverage appeared.  Although four 
years old, the sentiments speak well to the Times’ efforts and to the capacity the paper 
has for shifting the way in which the press as a whole relates to its audiences: 
My reaction when I read the editors’ statement was this: why not do it 
every week or every day? Publishing continuous assessments would make 
the Times a leader in a different way, showing the rest of the news media 
what it means to examine yourself aggressively – that is, “without fear or 
favor”…Starting tomorrow, The New York Times could begin to speak 
more often, and with far greater candor, about is own performance – and 
find that its authority in the culture only grows as a result (Rosen, 2004, ¶ 
52, 53). 
 
The Times hasn’t yet take Rosen up on his suggestion to publish self-assessments 
on a daily basis, but the 2004 editors’ note – along with the Blair article in 2003 – does 
represent progress in the drive toward transparency.  Anyone who supports transparency 
as a modern news convention would argue that it is crucial to a journalism practice that 
emphasizes the connection between the press and the public.  And that connection, it 
would seem, is essential to the entire notion of a democratic press.  As James Carey 
explains it: 
The god term of journalism – the be-all and end-all, the term without 
which the entire enterprise fails to make sense – is the public.  Insofar as 
journalism is grounded, it is grounded in the public.  Insofar as journalism 
has a client, the client is the public.  The press justifies itself in the name 
of the public: It exists – or so it is regularly said – to inform the public, to 
serve as the extended eyes and ears of the public, to protect the public’s 
right to know, to serve the public interest.  The canons of journalism 
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originate in and flow from the relationship of the press to the public.  The 
public is totem and talisman, and an object of ritual homage (Carey, 1987, 
p. 5). 
 
The problem, according to Carey, is that we have a press that justifies itself in the 
name of the public but pays the public no heed other than by viewing it as audience and 
consumer.  Journalism is losing its critical connection to the public.  Through efforts at 
transparency –flawed as they may be – the press can begin a conversation with the public 
that makes strides in rebuilding that relationship, that ever-so-important connection that 
justifies its very existence. 
 Increased Self-Criticism.   The press as an institution has always paid lip service 
to the idea of being critiqued by outsiders, but the response to any actual act of criticism 
has been chilly.  And while journalists have maintained that they should engage in self-
criticism, the practice has never become fashionable.  Historically, criticism from within 
has been viewed with almost as much contempt as criticism from without.  In 1974, 
Carey made the following observation about press criticism.  
The very idea of criticism has become anathema to journalists, and the word 
itself has become a semantic beacon which unerringly attracts a host of 
emotional moths, some legitimate and some merely reflections of the 
psychology of the beleaguered…The subject of criticism has become rather 
too emotionally charged, and the press at its conventions and in its editorial 
pages is reacting with the grim-faced seriousness and beleaguered 
patriotism of Robert Taylor in the final scene of “Bataan” (Carey, 1974, p. 
227). 
 
Has anything changed since 1974?  Is journalism as thin-skinned to criticism as it was 30 
years ago?   If the note from the Times editors – what is clearly an act of self-criticism – 
is any indication, perhaps a step forward has been made. 
 Many of those who responded to the editors’ note recognized the step and 
commended it.  Greg Easterbrook of The New Republic wrote in his column, “‘I was 
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wrong’ are three of the hardest words to say.  It is highly commendable that the Times has 
in effect said these words” (2004, ¶ 1).  In doing so, Easterbrook continued, the Times 
admitted its fallibility and gave the public renewed reason to admire it.  Edward 
Wasserman called the editors’ note deeply impressive, a victory of professionalism, and a 
step toward reasserting moral leadership within a profession that badly needs it (2004).  
And Jack Shafer, the Slate writer who was one of the chief critics of the Times’ coverage, 
said that while the Times editors may not have been as self-critical as they should have 
been, they did what a lot of publications wouldn’t do.  “They said, ‘We published faulty 
stories.  We wish we’d done a better job.  And now we’re going to devote ourselves to 
going back and correcting the record’”  (Shafer cited in Kurtz, 2004, ¶ 99). 
 This act of self-criticism, Shafer maintained, is not something that only the Times 
should do, but an effort that the press as a whole should undertake.  For Shafer, every 
news organization should have a column called “Previously Thought to be True” that 
would provide a place, a format and an expectation for discussion of any issue where the 
coverage was fundamentally in error and where the effort is made to correct the record 
and become more accountable (Shafer cited Kurtz, 2004, ¶ 140).  This kind of effort, 
Shafer argued, recognizes that the press is a fallible institution made up of human beings 
who make mistakes.  “I’m a great believer in a journalist’s right to get it wrong,” he said.  
“In order for the truth to be discovered, there has to be a lot of breathing room” (Shafer 
cited in Kurtz, 2004, ¶ 141). 
 But this breathing room should be monitored – by those from both within and 
outside the press – for all democratic institutions must be subjected to systematic critical 
analysis lest they “be controlled by censorship or corrupted by [their] own power and 
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illusions” (Carey, 1974, p. 231).  While The New York Times’ steps toward self-criticism 
in the last four years represent progress toward an acceptance of at least one kind of 
criticism, one organization’s efforts cannot carry the weight for all, even if that 
organization is the institution’s figurehead and the one that sets the agenda for nearly 
every other news outlet in the country.  All of the news media should try to recognize 
what the Times is, perhaps, beginning to understand – that continuous critical attention is 
not a “mark of failure or irrelevance” but rather “a sign or vigor and importance” (Carey, 
1974, p. 240). 
In this process of learning to be self-critical, news organizations surely won’t get 
it all right, right away.  Even those who lauded the Times editors’ note as a fine act of 
self-criticism found its flaws.  Most markedly, several responses to the note pointed out 
that it was “buried” on Page A10 (unlike many of the problematic stories, which ran on 
the front page).ii  But criticism, like journalism itself, is the product of human endeavors.  
It may not always be done well, but doing it at all represents progress for an institution 
that has been throughout its history called “a wall of implacable arrogance” (Gladstone, 
2004, ¶ 15). 
 Increased Recognition of Collective Agency.  In its editors’ note, the Times was 
deliberate about not placing blame on any individual reporter or editor for the flawed Iraq 
coverage.  In fact, the editors spoke directly to critics who focused blame on individual 
reporters, saying the problem was more complicated:  “Editors at several levels who 
should have been challenging reporters and pressing for more skepticism were perhaps 
too intent on rushing scoops into the paper” (“From the Editors,” 2004, Sec. 4 p. 2).  In 
the eyes of the Times, the failure was an institutional one; and through the editors’ note, it 
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was the institution saying it made a mistake and the institution promising to set the record 
straight.   
 But the collective responsibility taken by the Times wasn’t satisfactory to some of 
those who responded to the editors’ note, and the reporters who wrote the Iraq stories – 
one, in particular – did not go unnamed for long.  In newspaper columns, TV 
appearances, and radio interviews that ran in the week following the editors’ note, Jack 
Shafer, Don Wycliff, Tim Rutten, Howard Kurtz, Paul Moore, Paul Janensch, Dan 
Kennedy and Daniel Okrent all named names, assuming, it seems, that someone in 
particular needed to shoulder the blame for the Times’ failures.  As Tim Rutten said in his 
column, the note was “novel in that it declined to name a single one of the reporters or 
editors who worked on the stories” (2004, p. E1).  Like Rutten, Howard Kurtz found the 
lack of finger pointing unusual: 
How do you not name the reporter?  I can’t imagine The New York Times 
writing a story or an editors’ note or correction about anybody working in 
a government agency or a corporation and writing around the fact that this 
was the person whose name was on, not all the stories, but some of the 
stories (2004, ¶ 118). 
 
Michael Getler responded to Kurtz that naming the reporters – as well as the editors – 
would have added credibility to the disclosure (Getler cited in Kurtz, 2004).  And Gene 
Foreman said he was “disappointed that the Times did not correct the record more 
prominently or name the journalists involved” (Foreman cited in Moore, 2004, 5C). 
 But why does credibility only come with outing particular individuals?  In his 
CNN conversation with both Kurtz and Getler, Jack Shafer argued that names might be 
important to journalists but for most news consumers: 
what they’re most interested in is the publication.  And it was The New 
York Times’ authority that’s being called into question here, and it’s The 
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New York Times as an institution which is saying, ‘Hey, we did it wrong.  
We’re going back’ (Shafer cited Kurtz, 2004, ¶ 124).  
 
The debate about whether the Times’ flawed coverage represents mistakes made 
by individuals or failings by an organization raises the issue of how both the press and the 
public view journalism and the organizations that engage in the practice.  Is The New 
York Times – and by further extension, the social institution of the press – a kind of 
collective moral agent, or can agency only be attributed to those individuals who 
comprise the collective? 
What would it mean if moral agency were granted to The New York Times?  To 
the news media as a whole?  Peter French, collective agency’s leading advocate, argues 
that agency is the power of an actor, and an actor is one who 1) has the ability to act 
intentionally, 2) has the ability to make rational decisions and consider rational 
arguments, and 3) has the facility to respond to events and ethical criticism (Kerlin, 
1997).  Although an organization or an institution cannot normally function without the 
activities of human beings, the agency of that organization – or institution – and of those 
human beings is not identical (Kerlin, 1997).  For French, the press can be fairly said to 
have agency because it has interests in doing those things that are likely to result in the 
realizations of its established goals, regardless of the transient self-interests of the 
individuals who comprise it (French, 1979). 
Simply put, the institution is more than the sum of its individual parts, and the 
actions of that institution are the result of the relationships that characterize the 
institution, not the individuals that comprise it.  For journalism particularly, this seems a 
useful way of conceptualizing moral responsibility.  Reporters and editors come and go, 
but the credibility of an institution such as the press does not shift with simple personnel 
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changes.  The public isn’t in the habit of blaming (or praising) reporters who write a 
piece, much less editors whose work is largely invisible.  Putting out a newspaper is a 
team activity, and the results of that work represent the entire organization.   
In this sense, the fact that the Times considered its failing a collective one 
represents progress toward an understanding that accountability – much less credibility – 
cannot be achieved through naming the wrongdoings of individual journalists.  If 
journalism is a public trust, that trust is not granted to people but to the enterprise, and 
neither the credibility of that enterprise will be restored nor its function fulfilled by 
blaming individuals or simply discounting their work and replacing it with the work of 
others.  A recognition by The New York Times that it is more than a group of individual 
journalists – that it is an integrated body with a collective identity – helps bring the 
organization’s self-understanding more in line with the way in which members of the 
public perceive it.  And a relationship – in this case, that between the press and the public 
– can only be made stronger when similar perceptions of that relationship are shared by 
both parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Life After the Moral Mistake 
 
The New York Times editors’ note and the responses that it prompted represent 
continued evidence that American journalism is in the midst of a credibility crisis.  Few 
would deny that The New York Times made mistakes in its coverage leading up to the war 
in Iraq, and the discourse surrounding these mistakes became symbolic of much that is 
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wrong with journalism today.  But what does life after the moral mistake look like – 
particularly when, in the midst of those mistakes, progress was also made toward a press 
that is more invested in its relationship with the public?  In rudimentary terms, does this 
case represent a net gain or a net loss for journalism?  
In reflecting on the themes that emerged from the case – both the problems and 
the progress – it becomes evident that the problems are found in the practice of news 
gathering and news telling, which results in news content.  Progress, on the other hand, is 
represented not in the actual content but in more ontological considerations and in the 
reflection and discourse around the question:  “What ought journalism be?”  Whether on 
the whole the problems are more damaging or the progress more beneficial is yet to be 
fully determined, but it seems an opportunity exists for The New York Times – and the 
press as an institution – to both learn from its mistakes and capitalize on its steps forward. 
The New York Times has started by recognizing its mistakes and disclosing them 
to a public who is owed a pledge of loyalty.  This represents development toward moral 
accountability.  In contemplating the mistakes, perhaps the Times and other news 
organizations can recognize the need for critique of what have become some of craft’s 
most pervasive but problematic conventions – conventions that are contributing toward a 
growing crisis of credibility.  And in contemplating the progress, the Times and other 
news organizations can begin to formulate a new vision for the press, a vision more 
suitable to the complexities of the modern day and to a landscape that is constantly in 
flux.  This vision conceptualizes the press as: 
• More reflective –an institution willing to be self-critical as well as 
accepting of outside criticism 
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• More transparent – an institution vested in dialogue, both within its own 
ranks as well as with members of the public 
• More holistic – an institution that views itself in relational terms rather 
than individual terms 
• More egalitarian – an institution that recognizes the media are something 
shared by all and one that treads carefully with its power  
• More humble – an institution that views itself as a human endeavor – 
fallible but always striving to excel 
Moral development theory contends that development progresses when an agent – 
either an individual or a collective – finds that its current modus operandi is inadequate 
for dealing with the intricacies of its situation.  The situation in which The New York 
Times finds itself can be viewed as an opportunity for moral development.  If the Times 
can take steps to confront the problems created by its flawed coverage while 
simultaneously capitalizing on opportunities for progress created by these problems, the 
press institution – spurred on by its flagship organization – can find renewed life after the 
moral mistake. 
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Endnotes 
 
i This claim is based on findings from “The State of the News Media 2004” conducted by 
the Project for Excellence in Journalism. <www.stateofthenewsmedia.org> Retrieved 
September 20, 2004. 
 
ii See, for example, citations for Okrent, Shafer, and Wasserman in this paper. 
